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Patents and copyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphys-
ics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be very subtle
and refined, and sometimes, almost evanescent.'
Book Three\Earth, Chapter Four-Thus I have heard: Never make a
technical decision based upon the politics of the situation. Never make
a political decision based upon the technical issues. The only place
where these realms meet is in the mind of the unenlightened.2
I. INTRODUCTIONC OPYRIGHT law's primary goal is to "promote the progress of
science."3 Congress is authorized to accomplish this goal by giv-
ing to authors "the exclusive right to their ... writings" for limited
times.4 But the rights of authors are not completely exclusive; copyright
law attempts to best promote science by balancing the incentive of au-
thors to create against society's interest in the unhindered dissemination
1. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), quoted in
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977) (J., Story).
2. GEOFFREY JAMES, THE ZEN OF PROGRAMMING 71 (1988).




of ideas.5 Congress and the courts continually modify copyright law in
order to keep these interests properly balanced. 6 Ironically, it is primar-
ily the constant development of science and technology, the very goal of
copyright law, that is responsible for repeatedly upsetting the delicate
balance between these competing interests. 7
The history of copyright law is replete with examples of new technol-
ogy pushing the outer limits of copyright law, often to the point of forcing
copyright law to evolve or risk becoming ineffective at promoting its un-
derlying goal.8 The effects of current and future technological innova-
tions upon copyright law appear to be no exception. 9
The potential information processing power available to the average
individual is greater today than ever before and will continue to increase
in the foreseeable future. 10 But, along with this power comes the ability
for the average individual to thwart copyright law on an unprecedented
national or global scale."
These latest technological challenges have not gone unnoticed. The In-
formation Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), formed by President Clinton
in 1993, recently published a thorough analysis of the effect of the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure (NII) on intellectual property issues,
along with several recommendations for changes to U.S. intellectual
property law and policy.12 To date, these recommendations remain just
that, as Congress has not enacted them as law, nor have the courts
adopted them as descriptive of current law. 13
This Comment focuses on the interrelationship of technological inno-
vation and copyright law development. Part II describes the historical
influence of technology on copyright law. Part III addresses recent modi-
fications to copyright law by Congress, and the associated technological
innovations driving those modifications. Part IV provides examples of
the courts molding copyright law to fit or encompass new technology.
Part V describes the newest technological challenges to copyright law and
the initial responses of the legislature and the courts. Part VI analyzes
possible solutions for these latest challenges, with emphasis on the recent
proposals by the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights. Part
VII summarizes and concludes the Comment.
5. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 430-31.
8. See id. at 430 n.11.
9. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 5 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
10. Id. at 7-12.
11. See id. at 12.
12. Id. at 2, 12.
13. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.04(A)(3)(e), at 12-98.2 n.129.22 (Release 40 1996).
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II. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Evolutionary and revolutionary technological innovations have influ-
enced the main legislative acts and amendments of copyright law
throughout history. The following sections briefly describe the principal
legislative acts, with emphasis on the effects of new technology and on
copyright law's expansion to cover that technology.
A. THE STATUTE OF ANNE
"From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to
significant changes in technology."'1 4 In fact, copyright protection origi-
nally developed in England in response to the invention of the printing
press.15 The printing press was introduced into England in 1476, allowing
large-scale reproduction of books for the first time.16 Apparently to limit
and control dissemination of religious materials, the Crown granted a
monopoly in 1534,17 not to authors, but to the Stationers' Company, giv-
ing it the exclusive right to publish all printed works.18
The monopoly expired in 1694 and the Stationers' Company, fearing
competition, petitioned Parliament over the next several years to renew
the monopoly, albeit unsuccessfully. 19 Switching to a different tactic, the
Stationers' Company then petitioned Parliament to grant property rights
to the authors of books, under a belief that the Stationers could still con-
trol a monopoly through the authors. 20 In response, Parliament passed
the first copyright act, the Statute of Anne,21 in 1710.22
The primary goal of the Statute of Anne was to enhance the public
welfare by encouraging the dissemination of knowledge.2 3 It accom-
plished this by giving authors the exclusive right to make copies of their
writings for a limited number of years.24 The Statute of Anne signaled an
important shift in emphasis from the Stationers' Company to the rights of
authors in general.25 After the Statute of Anne, the Stationers were un-
able to continue their monopoly in published material.26
14. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430.
15. Id.
16. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 1995).
17. Id.
18. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990).
19. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (1994).
20. Id.
21. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies during the Times therein mentioned,
1709, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.), reprinted in 3 PATRY, supra note 19, at 1461-64.
22. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 974.
23. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 1.2.
24. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affd, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).




The unforeseen results of the events surrounding the Statute of Anne's
passage exemplify how the future effects of both technology and the law
can be difficult to predict, let alone control.27
B. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Following the reasoning behind the Statute of Anne,28 the United
States Constitution empowers Congress to legislate copyright (and pat-
ent) statutes "[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries. ' 29 Of course, unlike much of
copyright law, this clause was not put in the Constitution in response to
specific technological change. It is, nevertheless, important to review the
rationale for the constitutional clause because of the strong relevance of
policy throughout the evolution of copyright law.
The economic philosophy of the constitutional clause is that the "en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors .... -"30 Although the
immediate effect of copyright is to reward the creative labor of authors,
the ultimate aim is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." 31 Authors are encouraged and rewarded for their creations, but
the motivation must promote the primary goal of broad dissemination of
creative works. 32 Not only is the reward of authors' efforts a secondary
consideration, the authors' "sweat of the brow" does not even enter into
the consideration of whether a work is copyrightable. 33
The underlying philosophy for copyright law thus requires a difficult
balancing act: the monopoly granted to authors over their works must be
strong enough to provide economic incentive to the authors, but limited
enough so as to not hinder society's interests in the widespread dissemi-
nation of those works and the free flow of ideas and information. 34
C. THE COPYRIGHT AcT OF 1790
Pursuant to the constitutional grant of authority, Congress promptly
passed the first Copyright Act of 1790,35 modeled on the Statute of Anne,
27. Cf. MICHAEL SULLIVAN-TRAINOR, DETOUR: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INFORMA-
TION SUPERHIGHWAY 194 (1994).
28. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 1.2; American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 9.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
31. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); accord Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Sony, 464 U.S. at 429;
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
32. Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156.
33. Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-64 (stating that originality is a constitutional requirement
and, notwithstanding the possible inequities, copyright awards originality, not effort).
34. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
35. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803
(1994)), reprinted in 3 PATRY, supra note 19, at 1488-90.
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and set the tone for subsequent copyright acts.36 On its face, the scope of
copyright law in the first act, i.e. the definition of "authors" and their
"writings," appeared to be fairly limited, covering only maps, charts, and
books.37 But as technology expanded both the scope of creative activity
and the means for reproducing manifestations of that activity, thereby
increasing their economic importance, Congress and the courts gave the
terms "authors" and "writings" an ever broadening scope.38
For example, in 1802 Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1790 to
include engravings and etchings. 39 Then, in 1831, Congress added musi-
cal compositions to the subject matter of copyright as part of a general
revision of the 1790 Act.40 In 1865, Congress extended the list to include
photographs and photographic negatives, at just the time that Mathew
Brady's Civil War pictures were becoming famous.41 In a second general
revision done in 1870, Congress granted protection to paintings, draw-
ings, chromolithographs and three dimensional works such as statues and
models.42
The definition of "authors" and "writings" is thus much broader than
the literal connotation.43 In the constitutional sense, an "author" means
"'he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker" '44 and not just
an individual who writes a composition. 45 Likewise, the constitutional
definition of "writings" includes "any physical rendering of the fruits of
creative or aesthetic labor," and not just script or printed material.46
These broad definitions allow copyright law to extend to creative works
in technologies that do not yet exist.
D. THE COPYRIGHT Acr OF 1909
In 1908, the Supreme Court denied copyright infringement claims
brought by musical composers against the manufacturers of perforated
36. American Geophysical, 802 F. Supp. at 9; LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 1.3.
37. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 n.17 (1973).
38. Id. at 561-62.
39. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36,2 Stat. 171 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102); Mazer,
347 U.S. at 208.
40. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803),
reprinted in 3 PATRY, supra note 19, at 1491-94. This was the first of four general revisions
to copyright law; the subsequent general revisions were passed in 1870, 1909, and 1976. 1
PATRY, supra note 19, at 38-39 & n.114.
41. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102);
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562 n.17; accord Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S.
53, 56-58 (1884).
42. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803);
Mazer, 347 U.S. at 209; see, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903).
43. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561.
44. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58).
45. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58).
46. Id. at 561-62. As broad as these terms are, however, it is important to remember
that they are constitutionally limited to "original" works. Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
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musical rolls for player pianos.47 The musical roll industry developed
rapidly during the period prior to this holding which involved significant
but previously unaddressed questions of property interest.4 8 Despite the
economic importance, the Court held that musical rolls are not copies of
the original sheet music because people cannot directly read the music on
the rolls.4 9 The Court indicated that Congress would need to act in order
to cure the unjustness caused by the free use of the copyrighted works.50
In response to this and other pressures, Congress consolidated and
amended the federal copyright statutes in the Copyright Act of 1909.51
The 1909 Act emphasized that copyrights could be obtained for "all writ-
ings of an author, ' 52 and listed eleven nonexclusive classes of protected
works, including many that did not even exist at the time of the Copyright
Act of 1790.53 The amendment was deemed necessary because "'the re-
production of various things which are the subject of copyright has enor-
mously increased,' and that the President has specifically recommended
revision ... because the prior laws 'omit[ted] provision for many articles
which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to
protection."' 54
Almost immediately, new technology and its economic impact forced
Congress to amend the 1909 Act to create two new classes of subject
matter, specifically providing coverage for motion pictures.55 The con-
gressional reports on the amendment stated:
The occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the pro-
duction of [motion pictures] has become a business of vast propor-
47. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 1 (1908).
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id.
51. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, chs. 319-20, 35 Stat. 1 (current version at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803), reprinted in 3 PARRY, supra note 19, at 1500-12; see White-Smith
Music, 209 U.S. at 18; Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562.
52. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 4 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
53. Id. § 5 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). The eleven classes were:
(a) Books, including composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gazet-
teers, and other compilations;
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, prepared for oral delivery;
(d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions;
(e) Musical compositions;
(f) Maps;
(g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art;
(h) Reproductions of a work of art;
(i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(j) Photographs;
(k) Prints and pictorial illustrations ....
Id.
54. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562 n.17 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222,60th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1909) (quoting Samuel J. Elder and President Theodore Roosevelt) (brackets in
original)).
55. Id. The two classes were "motion-picture photoplays" and "motion pictures other
than photoplays." Id. The first category covered dramatic motion pictures and the second
category covered newsreels, travelogues, and the like. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 61-62.
1997]
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tions. The money invested therein is so great and the property rights
so valuable that the committee is of the opinion that the copyright
law ought to be amended as to give them distinct and definite
recognition. 56
There were no congressional extensions of copyright's subject matter
for a long period after the motion picture amendment. The acceleration
of technological development in the twentieth century, however, com-
pelled Congress to investigate a major revision of the increasingly out-
dated 1909 Act.57 In 1955, Congress commenced a copyright revision
project that eventually took twenty years to finish.58 During this period,
Congress delayed many needed changes to copyright law, intending to
incorporate the changes in the final product of the revision process. 59
However, the economic importance of one area, sound recordings, was
too great to await the omnibus revision. 60 The development of the audio
tape recorder permitted mass production of illegal audio tapes, which ac-
counted for more than twenty percent (over $100 million) of the annual
audio tape market. 61 Therefore, in 1971, five years before the general
revision, Congress added the class of sound recordings (as opposed to the
already protected underlying composers' works) to the subject matter of
copyright.62 The author's exclusive rights in sound recordings were lim-
ited to §§ 106(1)-(3), however, and specifically did not include perform-
ance rights under § 106(4).63
E. THE COPYRIGHT AcT OF 1976
Twenty years of revisional effort culminated in the Copyright Act of
1976,64 the foundation of current copyright law. Although there were
56. H.R. REP. No. 756, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1912); S. REP. No. 906, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1912).
57. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 1.4.
58. Id.
59. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 74.
60. H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971).
61. Id.; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.11
(1984).
62. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 568 (citing Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat.
391 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102)).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). But see discussion infra part V.B.
64. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. 88 101-803), reprinted in 3 PArRY, supra note 19, at 1531-87. The 1976 Act rede-
fined copyrightable subject matter as subsisting in:
[o]riginal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
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many reasons for the effort's extended length,65 new technological inno-
vations were a significant factor in the long delay.66 New copying tech-
nology,67 cable television and computer software all prominently
influenced the passage of the 1976 Act. 68
For example, the advent of cable television at first hindered, then accel-
erated the revision effort.69 In 1968, the Supreme Court held that cable
television operators are more like viewers than broadcasters in that they
do not perform the programs that they receive and retransmit, and thus
do not infringe those copyrighted programs. 70 The court acknowledged
that the 1909 Act must be read in light of drastic technological changes.
But the Court ultimately held that it was the responsibility of Congress to
take account of the various political considerations in modifying copy-
right protection.71 Congress initially could not reach a consensus,72 but
the next Supreme Court decision on the issue73 prompted Congress into
action. 74 In Teleprompter, the Supreme Court extended Fortnightly by
holding that even cable retransmission to households that normally could
not receive the broadcast did not constitute copyright infringement.75
Congress resolved the issue in the 1976 Act by imposing copyright liabil-
ity on cable television systems, but also provided them with a compulsory
license. 76
Copyright protection for computer programs proved more contentious
than for cable television, so Congress established the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in
1974 to investigate the issue and make recommendations. 77 But Congress
decided that it could not delay the revision any longer and passed the
1976 Act before receiving CONTU's recommendations. 78 The 1976 Act
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Congress added an eighth category, architectural works, in a later
amendment. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
65. 1 PARRY, supra note 19, at 74-89. There were extensive debates on most of the
modifications in the 1976 Act, which included: (1) establishment of seven (now eight)
broad categories of copyrightable subject matter; (2) codification of the fair use defense
previously developed by the courts; (3) preemption of common law copyright by eliminat-
ing the distinction between published and unpublished works; (4) replacing the dual
twenty-eight year terms with a single term of life of the author plus fifty years; and (5)
simplification of the formal procedures. Id. at 88-89.
66. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 430 n.ll (1984).
67. Id. Congress granted a library copying exemption in § 108 of the 1976 Act. Id.
See discussion infra part IV.B. for recent developments in the photocopying area.
68. Id.; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 1988).
69. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 83-84.
70. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1968).
71. Id. at 396, 401-02.
72. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 n.16
(1974).
73. Id.
74. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 84.
75. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 412.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 111.
77. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 104); Vault, 847 F.2d at 259.
78. Vault, 847 F.2d at 259.
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merely included computer programs in the definition of literary works79
and basically maintained the status quo80 pending the outcome of
CONTU's investigation.81
III. STATUTORY COPYRIGHT LAW IS DRIVEN BY
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Advancing technology continued to strongly influence copyright law
after the 1976 Act. The following sections briefly describe various con-
gressional amendments addressing recent technological developments.
In each case, congressional action was necessary because of the important
role new technology played in the national economy and to the United
States' competitiveness in the global market.
A. THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT Acr OF 1980
In 1978, CONTU completed its research and issued a final report, de-
tailing its recommendations for computer programs. 82 CONTU asserted
that protection was necessary because "[t]he cost of developing computer
programs is far greater than the cost of their duplication. '83 But CONTU
also recognized that the economic interests of computer program authors
needed to be balanced against the undue burdening of computer program
users.84 Therefore, CONTU recommended two changes: (1) adding a
definition of a computer program to § 10185 and (2) replacing the existing
§ 117 with a new § 117, which proscribed unauthorized copying of com-
puter programs but allowed a rightful possessor to make a copy or adap-
tation if necessary to use the program or for archival purposes. 86 In 1980,
Congress passed the Computer Software Copyright Act, adopting
CONTU's recommendations, and thus recognizing computer programs as
copyrightable subject matter.87
Unfortunately, the exemptions provided by § 117 contemplate owner-
ship of a physical copy of the software (e.g., on a diskette), but with tech-
nology quickly advancing to the point where software may be sold by
digital transmission, the effectiveness of § 117 may be called into ques-
79. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
80. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 117); Vault, 847 F.2d at 259.
81. Vault, 847 F.2d at 259. The outcome of the CONTU study is discussed infra part
III.A.
82. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
83. Id. at 26.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 30. A computer program is a "set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C.§ 101.
86. CONTU REPORT, supra note 82, at 29-30.
87. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117; see Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028. Congress did make one change to the recommendations by replacing "rightful pos-
sessors" with "owners" in § 117.
[Vol. 50
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tion.88 Moreover, the Computer Software Copyright Act did not resolve
the issue of exactly what portions of a computer program are copyright-
able, and the courts are still grappling with that question. 89
B. THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984
Computer programs were not the only computer related product re-
quiring extra assurance of protection. Similar to software, semiconductor
masks used to manufacture integrated circuits are expensive to produce
but relatively easy to copy.90 Also similar to software, semiconductor
masks do not fit cleanly into traditional copyright law, primarily due to
their utilitarian nature.91 However, because of their extreme importance
to the national economy, Congress enacted the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984 (Mask Work Act). 92
The Mask Work Act provides protection for semiconductor integrated
circuits that is partly sui generis in nature but is still based on copyright
law concepts.93 The Mask Work Act protects the masks from literal
copying.94 Like a standard copyright, originality is the key requirement,
and independently created identical masks do not infringe on each
other.95 Unlike a standard copyright, however, the Mask Work Act only
protects masks for a period of ten years,96 which is actually a substantial
length of time in the fast-paced semiconductor industry.
C. THE RECORD RENTAL AMENDMENT OF 1984
During the same time period, another new technology, the compact
disc, threatened to upset the balance between copyright owners and con-
sumers of their works. Prior to the compact disc, the rental of sound
recordings on vinyl records or cassette tapes to consumers without the
payment of royalties was not considered a great problem because of the
fragile nature and less than perfect quality of those mediums. Many
viewed commercial rental of sturdy, high quality compact discs to con-
sumers owning audio tape recorders, however, as a serious threat to the
88. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.08(B)(1), at n.35.
89. E.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an
equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam). Computer programs are quite
different from traditional copyrightable subject matter, and, thus, computer programs are
in some respects forced to fit into traditional copyright definitions and tests. Compare id.
at 816 (holding that a program's menu command hierarchy is uncopyrightable method of
operation) with Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251
(3d Cir. 1983) (holding that an operating system is not a method of operation and, thus, is
not precluded from copyright protection). See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
90. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8A.02(A).
91. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 3.9.
92. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14).




96. 17 U.S.C. § 904.
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music industry that could usurp much of the sales market.97 When com-
pact discs were released, copyright ownership was limited by the first sale
doctrine, whereby a copyright owner did not have any control over the
disposition of a particular copy by a lawful possessor. 98 Therefore, Con-
gress enacted the Record Rental Amendment of 1984,99 which prevents
the rental, lease, or lending of sound recordings for commercial advan-
tage, and thus restored the delicate balance that once again had been
upset by new technology.
D. THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE RENTAL AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1990
For similar reasons, Congress enacted the Computer Software Rental
Amendments Act of 1990,100 prohibiting the rental, lease or lending of
computer programs for commercial benefit. 101 Like compact discs, com-
puter programs are stored digitally and can be rented over and over with-
out any degradation in quality. In addition, the rental of programs could
function merely as a front for wholesale illegal copying, and use of those
copies after the rental period expired. As with compact discs, commercial
rental of computer programs would severely reduce the sales market, and
hence the economic incentive for the producers of computer programs.
One court recently held that § 109 prohibits not only outright rentals,
but also transactions that are rentals in substance.102 The court stated
that the defendant's deferred billing plan, which initially charged custom-
ers a small nonrefundable down payment and charged the full balance
only if the software was not returned within five days, was in the nature
of a rental.' 0 3 The court distinguished this scheme from return policies
that allow a truly unsatisfied customer to return software for a refund less
a true restocking fee. 104 Whether courts can use this distinction as a
workable approach in classifying a fact pattern as legal or illegal has yet
to be determined.
E. THE AUDIO HOME RECORDING ACT OF 1992
In 1992, Congress was forced to address yet another new development
in audio electronics, digital audio recording.' 0 5 Unlike an analog re-
97. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12(B)(7); see discussion supra part II.D.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
99. Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (amend-
ing 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 115). Although the original Act had a sunset review clause, Congress
eventually eliminated the termination date in order to comply with international treaties. 2
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12(B)(7), at n.145 (citing Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§ 332, 107 Stat. 2057 (Dec. 8, 1993)).
100. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134-37
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)).
101. Id.
102. Central Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 F. Supp.
957, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12(B)(8), at n.153.
103. Central Point Software, 880 F. Supp. at 965.
104. Id.
105. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 112-13.
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corder, a digital recorder could make perfect, multi-generational copies
of a source, especially a digital source such as a compact disc.106 Once
again, the balance between copyright owners and consumers was being
tipped away from copyright owners. This technology pitted the electron-
ics industry, the makers of the recording machines, against the music in-
dustry, the owners of the copyrighted material. 10 7
In response, Congress enacted the partly sui generis Audio Home Re-
cording Act of 1992,108 a political compromise between the two compet-
ing interests. 10 9 The Audio Home Recording Act represents a break
from the traditional copyright approach of limiting the use of new tech-
nology in copying copyrighted works." 0 Instead, the Act places legal re-
straints on the technology itself by requiring each "digital audio recording
... or... interface device""' to conform to the "Serial Copy Manage-
ment System. '' 112 Under this system, the recording device can produce
copies by recording directly from an original source (e.g., a compact disc)
for an unlimited number of times, but a second copy cannot be recorded
from the first generation copies (i.e., serial copying is prohibited). 113 In
addition, royalties are paid for the sale of each digital audio recording
device and medium. 114
This legislation is too new and the market in digital recorders too
young to determine whether and how well the legislation will work. It
remains to be seen what type of approach is better at promoting its re-
spective technology: the sui generis approach of the Audio Home Re-
cording Act and the Mask Work Act or the minor adjustment of existing
law approach in the computer software area. If the Audio Home Record-
ing Act functions as intended, it may set a precedent for legislative com-
promises in the future." 5
IV. THE COURTS CONTINUE TO MOLD COPYRIGHT LAW
TO COMPENSATE FOR NEW TECHNOLOGY
Part III illustrates two very different types of challenges currently fac-
ing copyright law. The Computer Software Copyright Act and the Semi-
conductor Chip Protection Act address whether works created with new
technology should be included in the subject matter of copyright. In con-
106. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8B.01(A).
107. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 8.29(A).
108. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10).
109. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8B.01(C).
110. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 8.29(A).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a).
112. Id. § 1002(a)(1).
113. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8B.01(C).
114. 1 PATRY, supra note 19, at 113.
115. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 8.29(B). This is not the first legislation to limit technol-
ogy itself; 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) prohibits the manufacture or distribution of devices that
are "primarily" used for unauthorized decryption of satellite cable programming. 47
U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (1994).
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trast, the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act, the Record
Rental Amendment and the Audio Home Recording Act address en-
forceability and extent of an author's exclusive rights in acknowledged
copyrightable works when new technology shifts the balance toward the
copyright owners or, as is usually the case, toward the users of the works.
The remainder of this Comment focuses on the second issue: the en-
forceability of the law and the extent of exclusive rights in copyrights as
affected by new technologies.11 6 This section discusses the courts' re-
sponse to two examples of new technology, home video taping and
photocopying.
The following two cases analyze in detail the extent of a copyright
owner's exclusive rights and exceptions to those rights. The five exclusive
rights of a copyright owner are enumerated in § 106.117 A copyright
owner has the exclusive right to (1) reproduce the work, (2) prepare de-
rivative works, (3) distribute copies-to the public, (4) perform certain cat-
egories of works, and (5) display certain categories of works publicly.118
Although these rights are broad, the copyright owner does not possess
complete control over all reproductions of a copyrighted work.11 9 Sec-
116. The first issue is far from resolved with respect to computer programs, and will
continue to be raised in the future as new and unforeseen technologies give rise to new
forms of expression. The courts are presently debating the extent of copyright protection
for computer programs. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.
1995), affid by an equally divided court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996) (per curiam). One of the
most difficult statutes to apply properly to computer programs is 17 U.S.C. § 102(b),
prohibiting protection for any "idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Complicating this determination is
the question of the extent, if any, to which the specific protection provided to computer
programs by 17 U.S.C. § 117 affects the application of § 102(b). Lotus, 49 F.3d at 820
(Boudin, J., concurring). In other words, because Congress declared computer programs
explicitly copyrightable under § 117, should the fact that programs inherently involve some
sort of procedure or a method of operation be given less weight than in the traditional
case?
Until 1995, the courts were heading for what appeared to be a workable compromise set
out by the Second Circuit in Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1992). In Computer Associates, the Second Circuit applied an abstraction-filtration-
comparison test to determine what nonliteral aspects of a computer program are protected
copyrightable expression for comparison to another work. Id. at 706. Presumably because
of § 117, the court did not attempt to strictly apply § 102(b). Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
But, in 1995, the First Circuit held that the menu hierarchy of a computer program is an
unprotectable method of operation under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and that § 117 does not apply
to the menu command hierarchy of a computer program. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815-16. The
one-sentence per curiam affirmation by an equally divided Supreme Court, Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996), does not provide the much needed gui-
dance that is urgently sought in the software field. See Deadlocked Court Affirms Lotus
One Week After Oral Argument, 51 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1261, at 367
(Jan. 18, 1996); see also Copyright Protection for Software Menu Hierarchy Will Be Re-
viewed, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1246, at 609 (Sept. 28, 1995).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
118. Id. Exclusive right (4) applies to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works .... " Id. § 106(4).
Exclusive right (5) applies to "literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work . . . ." Id. § 106(5).
119. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432-33.
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tions 107 through 120 describe various limitations on a copyright owner's
exclusive rights. 120 The important limitation for immediate purposes is
that of "fair use.' 12' Under § 107, fair use "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.. . , scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. '122 In determining whether a specific use is
fair, the following factors are considered:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 123
As the following cases illustrate, balancing a copyright owner's exclu-
sive rights against the public's fair use of the copyrighted works, in order
to achieve the underlying goals of copyright law, is a challenge con-
fronting the courts each time a new reproductive technology arises.
A. HOME VIDEOTAPING
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Sony Corp. of America v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc.,124 which pitted the entertainment industry against
the electronics industry.1 25 The defendant, Sony, manufactured and sold
the recently introduced but extremely popular video cassette recorder
(VCR). The plaintiffs, Universal Studios and Walt Disney, held a sub-
stantial number of copyrights for motion pictures and other audiovisual
works broadcast on television that were being recorded by VCR owners.
The plaintiffs sued Sony as a contributory infringer of their copyrights. 126
The Supreme Court faced two issues in the case with possibly broad im-
plications for future technologies.
The first issue was whether private, noncommercial "time-shifting"' 27
of copyrighted broadcast television programs constitutes a fair use.128
Applying the four factor test of § 107, the Court held that such time-
shifting is indeed fair use. 129 Time-shifting for private home use is a non-
120. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20.
121. Id. § 107.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 107(1)-(4).
124. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
125. The uncertainty of a judicial outcome such as Sony may have spurred the electron-
ics industry and the music industry to come to the legislative compromise achieved ten
years later in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992. See discussion supra part III.E.
126. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
127. Time-shifting is the recording of a television program that the viewer cannot watch
at the time of airing and the subsequent viewing of the program at a more convenient time.
Id. at 421.
128. Id. The Court addressed the time-shifting issue only, and did not address the issue
of permanent archiving of copyrighted material by users.
129. Id. at 454-56.
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commercial, private activity, so § 107(1) favored Sony.' 30 Section 107(2)
also supported Sony because part of the nature of a televised work is that
it is broadcast free of charge.' 31 On the other hand, § 107(3) favored
Universal because the entire work is copied.' 32 Section 107(4), however,
strengthened Sony's position because Universal failed to demonstrate
that time-shifting causes any demonstratable harm to the potential mar-
ket for the copyrighted work. 133 If anything, the market probably bene-
fits because time-shifting permits more viewers to watch televised
programs. 134 In aggregate, the four factors weighed in favor of Sony and
fair use.' 35
The first issue affected the outcome of the second issue, which is
whether the sale of a VCR by Sony to consumers who are recording
copyrighted programs constitutes contributory infringement.' 36 The
Court held that Sony was not liable because the VCR is capable of a
substantial noninfringing use. 137 The Court found that the private, non-
commercial time-shifting of programs in the home meets this standard.' 38
This is true whether the VCR is used (1) for time-shifting authorized by
other copyright owners, or (2) for unauthorized time-shifting because it is
a fair use. 139
In holding for Sony, the Court recognized that a balance must be struck
"between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not
merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.' 140
In addition, the Court repeatedly stated that Congress, not the Court, is
130. Id. at 496.
131. Id. at 499. This aspect of the nature of a copyrighted work does not appear to be
the appropriate measure. Instead, the nature of a copyrighted work should more appropri-
ately focus on the extent that the work embodies creative expression as opposed to factual
material. See American Geophysical Union, v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir.
1995).
132. Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50.
133. Id. at 454.
134. Id. However, advances in technology, from the infrared remote, to visual fast-
forwarding, to the recent commercial-skipping VCRs, may mean that there are more view-
ers of the program itself, but less viewers of the commercials, which are, of course, the
source of revenue. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.05(F)(5)(b)(i).
135. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994), the Supreme Court emphasized that in the application of the § 107 four-factor test,
evidentiary presumptions biasing any of the four factors toward or away from fair use are
not appropriate. Id. at 593. Instead, all four factors must be applied and analyzed on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 577. Additionally, the Court found that the more transformative
the copy, the less important its commercial use. Id. at 579; 1994 Resolves Some IP Issues,
Leaves Others Hanging for Coming Year, 49 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
1213, at 311-12 (Jan. 26, 1995) (suggesting that "there is as great an interest in building
upon copyrighted works as there is in creating original works").
136. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
137. Id. The Court analogized to the staple article of commerce doctrine in patent law,
35 U.S.C. § 271, which provides that the sale of an article suitable for substantial nonin-
fringing use is not contributory infringement. Id. at 440.
138. Id. at 442.
139. Id.
140. Id. The Court did appear to reserve the option of reappraising home videotaping
at a later date because it based its decision on evolving empirical data. Id. at 455.
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the proper governmental body to reach a compromise that fully takes
into account the competing interests on both sides of a new
technology. 141
B. PHOTOCOPYING
In 1995, the Second Circuit decided American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc.,142 another case that applied the § 107 fair use test to a rela-
tively new technological innovation. 143 A group of publishers sued Tex-
aco because of its practice of circulating journals from which scientists
photocopied articles of interest.144
"[T]he invention and widespread availability of photocopying technol-
ogy threatens to disrupt the delicate balances established by the Copy-
right Act,"'1 45 thus creating "a pressing need for the law 'to strike an
appropriate balance between the authors' interest in preserving the integ-
rity of copyright, and the public's right to enjoy the benefits that photo-
copying technology offers.""'146
The specific issue decided by the court was whether the photocopying
of articles in a scientific journal by a research scientist constitutes fair
use.147 After extensive analysis, the court held that "institutional, system-
atic, archival"' 48 copying of copyrighted materials by an employee is not
a fair use. 149 The court stressed that the ruling applies only to the specific
facts of the case, and that other situations, such as individuals photocopy-
ing for personal use, may constitute fair use or de minimis copying, and
must be analyzed on their own facts. 150
In applying § 107, the court held that the first fair use factor favored
the publishers because the primary purpose of Texaco's use was nontrans-
formative archival, thus supplanting the purchase or licensing of addi-
tional subscriptions. 15 1 The second factor supported Texaco because of
141. Id. at 431,456. Congress appears to have done just that for a more recent technol-
ogy, digital audio recording. Ten years after Sony, the electronics industry and the music
industry achieved a legislative compromise with the passage of the Audio Home Recording
Act of 1992. See discussion supra part III.E.
142. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
143. Id. at 916.
144. Although such copying is both common and hard to detect, the publishers selected
Texaco because Texaco was paying less in royalties than similarly situated companies.
Junda Woo, Photocopying Case Shows Flaws in System to Monitor Royalties, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 3, 1995, at A15.
145. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 917.
146. Id. (quoting 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 13.05(E)(1)).
147. Id. at 914. The court actually questioned whether the fair use test should apply at
all to mechanically reproduced copies of an entire document, but in light of the Supreme
Court decision in Sony, the fair use test is proper. Id. at 917.
148. Id. at 931.
149. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931.
150. Id. at 931-32; see 1994 Resolves Some IP Issues, Leaves Others Hanging for Coming
Year, supra note 135, at 313.
151. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 924. The court acknowledged, however, that a primary use of
putting the work into a more usable format, or preserving the original from hazardous
conditions, might tip the first factor toward the defendant. Id. at 919.
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the factual nature of the copyrighted scientific articles. 152 However, the
third and fourth factors strengthened the publishers' position because
Texaco copied the articles in their entirety, 153 and because of lost licens-
ing and subscription revenues to the publishers. 154 Taken together, the
four factors weighed in favor of the publishers and against fair use. 155
The court concluded by stating that Texaco could easily remedy the situa-
tion by buying extra subscriptions or by paying royalties. 156
V. THE NEWEST TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO
COPYRIGHT LAW
A. DIGITAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
"One of the transforming scientific revolutions of the twentieth century
has been to capture words, sounds, and images in digital form. 1 57 In the
near future, technological developments will enable the average individ-
ual to digitally record, store, manipulate, reproduce, transmit and receive
information that can be represented in two-dimensional form.158
Two key components of this enablement are computers1 59 and the in-
terconnection of those computers.1 60 Digital processing of information
with computers is already well established. With input devices such as
scanners, cameras and microphones, computers can record and store basi-
cally any two-dimensional work. The cost of reproducing a copyrighted
work is typically much less than the development cost of that work. By
152. Id. at 924.
153. Id. at 926.
154. Id. at 931. The court acknowledged that only "traditional, reasonable or likely to
be developed markets" are relevant to determining harm to potential markets. Id. at 930.
Thus, a very important aspect of this case is the existence of the Copyright Clearance
Center, Inc. (CCC), a clearing-house established in 1977 for photocopying licensing. Id. at
929 & n.16. Because the CCC makes payment for licenses feasible, the publishers were
able to demonstrate a substantial harm to the potential licensing market. Id. at 930-31.
The proposition that the CCC provides a workable licensing scheme is somewhat contro-
versial. Id. at 938-39 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); Woo, supra note 144, at A15. For example,
the CCC only collects $28 million per year in royalties. Woo, supra note 144, at A15. Only
30% of the journals to which Texaco subscribes are covered by a CCC license. Texaco, 60
F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the CCC is fairly new, and its
licenses cover the majority of photocopying that is done. Woo, supra note 144, at A15
(quoting Robert S. Weiner, CCC vice president). Additionally, a precedent such as the
one set in this case should encourage CCC membership growth, or at the very least in-
crease corporate awareness. Id. The concept is definitely workable, as exhibited by the
$600 million per year music-licensing fee program. Id. The CCC may just need some time
to mature. In fact, the CCC recently entered into an agreement with Infosafe Systems,
Inc., which will operate kiosks at copy centers, making it easier for small businesses and
individuals to comply with copyright restrictions. Lisa Benavides, Deal Speeds Copyright
Clearance, BOSTON Bus. J., Jan. 24, 1997, at 3. And the CCC is working on software that
will provide copyright information to Internet users. Id.
155. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 931.
156. Id. at 932.
157. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 197 (1994).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 198.
160. Lisa E. Davis & Jaime Wolf, Licensing Intellectual Property on the Information
Superhighway, NBA NAT'L BAR Ass'N MAG., July-Aug. 1995, at 12.
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permitting easy reproduction of a work, computers pose a threat to copy-
right law similar to that of photocopiers, but more critical because the
range of reproducible works is dramatically increased with a computer.
Even so, the reproduction problem might be manageable if computers
were isolated from one another, thus making interchange of information
inefficient. This is not the case, however, because computers are being
connected to each other in various ways at an ever-increasing rate. A
prime example of that interconnection is the Internet, an international
communications network linking many smaller networks into a single
large one. 161 Actually, the Internet is only the forerunner of a more am-
bitious National Information Infrastructure (NII) (and eventually a
Global Information Infrastructure (GII)), which will link "formerly sepa-
rate media (i.e., cable television, broadcasting, on-line computer services
and telephone) into one high speed, interactive, broadband, digital
network." 162
The Internet was not considered a problem when it primarily con-
nected only government agencies and universities. 163 But with its current
widespread popularity,164 the Internet presents a substantial challenge to
copyright law. In effect, the Internet completes the digital revolution by
allowing the average individual to digitally transmit and receive works
with anyone or everyone connected to the network. Traditional copyright
law is built upon the distinctions between the various types of works and
how those works are manifested. But the Internet is forcing the distinc-
tions to collapse because all works can be treated as "undifferentiated bit
streams [which are] uniformly accessed."'1 65 As with any prediction, how-
ever, determining where all this will lead is very difficult. "The capability
and creativity of information technology and its users changes much
faster than any other technology ever has, making it impossible to deter-
161. Id. Other methods of interconnection include on-line services, bulletin boards,
and local area networks.
162. Davis & Wolf, supra note 160, at 12; see Richard Turner, Hollywired: The
Buzzword: Multimedia; The Hype: Entertainment Will Never Be the Same; The Reality:
Entertainment Will Never Be the Same, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at R1. Conceptually,
the Internet, Nil, GII, and other forms of digital connectivity pose the same challenges to
copyright law; therefore, these terms are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
163. Davis & Wolf, supra note 160, at 12.
164. Estimates vary greatly on the number of people connected to the Internet; how-
ever, it is undisputed that it is growing at an incredible pace. See Explosive Growth Fore-
cast for Internet, SCREEN DIG., June 1, 1995, at 1 (stating 30 million users year-end 1994,
and 550 million by year 2000); see also Laura Castafeda, New Medium, Old Message, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 1996, at H1 (stating that 37 million people in North America
have access, and 24 million people have used the Internet in the past three months); Num-
bers for the Web, IEEE SPECTRUM, Dec. 1995, at 64 (stating 24 million people in North
America have Internet access); Vic Sussman & Kenan Pollack, Gold Rush in Cyberspace,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 13, 1995, at 72, 74 (stating 37 million people in North
America have Internet access); Tech Bits, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Oct. 31, 1995, at C3
(stating 12 million subscribers to on-line services); Publisher O'Reilly's Survey Sizes US
Internet Use, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, Oct. 9, 1995, at 1 (stating 5.8 million users of Internet
only, 3.9 million users of on-line services only, and 1 million users of both).
165. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.24(A).
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mine outcomes with certainty."'1 66
Some aspects are certain, however. First, the very realization that we
cannot predict all the future effects of technology is useful knowledge in
itself.167 Initially, the NII will be adapted to meet needs and objectives
that we already know exist; although this facet can be envisioned fairly
accurately, all of its implications cannot be foreseen. 168 A new technol-
ogy also creates new and unexpected opportunities and can actually
change our behavior in the process. 169 Being aware of the unpredictabil-
ity can help us prepare for the future and hopefully avoid mistakes in
making that preparation.
The second certainty is that the copyright industries are crucial to the
national and global economies. 70
These industries, which include motion pictures and television pro-
grams, cable, records, music, computer software, photographs,
databases, traditional and electronic publishing, and multimedia CD-
ROMs, accounted for 5.69% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product in
1993 ($362.5 billion), employed new workers at four times the rate of
the economy as a whole from 1988-1993 and contributed an esti-
mated $45.8 billion in foreign sales in 1993. The protection of Amer-
ican creativity through copyright protection is a driving force behind
our continued prosperity and progress. 71
In light of the unpredictability of the future and the increasing impor-
tance of copyright law, any modification to the law must be carefully ana-
lyzed. The following sections discuss the responses of the legislature and
the courts to the interconnection of digital media.
B. THE DIGITAL PERFORMANCE RIGHT LAW OF 1995
The balance between sound recording copyright owners and users of
those recordings has traditionally been tilted toward the users. The pri-
mary reason for the bias is that the United States has not recognized a
performance right in sound recordings. 72 Two considerations, one long-
standing and one still developing, have prompted Congress to readdress
this issue. First, because foreign rights are usually based on reciprocity in
the home nation of the artist, American performers are losing a great
deal of money by not receiving foreign performance royalties. 73 Second,
digital music transmission services are now becoming viable. These serv-
ices may eventually supplant the traditional music sales market, from




170. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Testimony Before
Senate Subcommittee on Legislative Appropriations, May 15, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
1995 WL 295393.
171. Id.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1994).
173. President Clinton Signs Bills on Biotech Patents, Performance Rights, 51 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1252, at 45, 45 (Nov. 9, 1995).
[Vol. 50
COPYRIGHT LAW
which artists currently receive the bulk of their revenue. 174
To realign the balance toward copyright owners, Congress passed a law
effective February 1, 1996, providing sound recording copyright owners
with an exclusive performance right to works performed through sub-
scription service digital transmissions. 175
This new right is limited in scope, as it does not apply to traditional
radio, television and background music services, nor to restaurants,
stores, hotels or amusement parks. 176 At present, the broadcast industry
appears to have sufficient political influence to prevent the passage of a
law granting broad performance rights in sound recordings. 177 Neverthe-
less, because there is not yet an established base in digital music transmis-
sion, Congress was able to reach an accord between the recording and
publishing industries. 178
It is hard to determine at this point whether this is as far as the per-
formance right in sound recordings will reach, or if it is just the first step
in expanding that performance right to other areas. In either case, this is
one of the first copyright laws to specifically address the digital transmis-
sion of a copyrighted work.
C. ON-LINE SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY
The courts also have begun to address the legal implications of digital
transmission of copyrighted works.179 Although no federal appeals
courts have addressed the issue yet, several district courts have grappled
with the enforceability of copyrights in digital transmissions. 180 If a work
is transmitted digitally without permission of the copyright owner, one
difficult issue is whether, and under what legal theory, an on-line service
provider is liable for the transmission. 18 1
In assigning liability, an important underlying consideration is deter-
mining the best party to hold responsible in order to effectively enforce
the law. There are basically three parties involved in a digital transmis-
sion of information: (1) the sender, (2) the receiver, and (3) the provider
of the on-line service. Of course, the provider may also be the sender or
the receiver. One problem for the copyright owner (and the courts) is
that the sender or receiver may be beyond reach. For example, the
sender either may be in a foreign jurisdiction or anonymous or very diffi-
174. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.21(A).
175. Digital Performance Right Law, Pub. L. No. 104-39 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(6)).
176. President Clinton Signs Bills on Biotech Patents, Performance Rights, supra note
173, at 46.
177. LEAFFER, supra note 16, § 8.24.
178. President Clinton Signs Bills on Biotech Patents, Performance Rights, supra note
173, at 46.
179. Copyright Office Registration Reforms and Restoration Procedures Are Aired, 50
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1228, at 34, 36 (May 11, 1995).
180. Constance Johnson, On-Line: Courts Struggle with Definition of Cyberspace,
WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at 1, B14.
181. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04(A)(3)(e).
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cult to trace. The receiver may also be hard to trace, or, on the opposite
side of the spectrum, may actually be a very large number of people who
downloaded copyrighted material. In the above instances, the on-line
service provider makes for a much easier target both for tracking down
and for payment of damages.
However, the issue of knowledge must be addressed when determining
the various parties' liability. Ty pically the sender would have the knowl-
edge or reason to have knowledge of the copyright in a work. The issue is
much less clear when examining the liability of the receiver and especially
the service provider. Various approaches to these issues by the courts are
discussed below.
1. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.
One of the first cases to confront the extent of service provider liability
involved defamation, not copyright. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc.,182 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
addressed the liability of CompuServe for alleged libel by one of its con-
tributors. 183 As an on-line service, CompuServe provides subscribers
with access to various forums, which are composed of electronic bulletin
boards, interactive conferences, and topical databases. The plaintiff,
Cubby, Inc., sued CompuServe for libel for material placed on the Jour-
nalism Forum, the content of which is managed and controlled by a sepa-
rate company. 184
The district court found that CompuServe's service is basically an elec-
tronic, for-profit library, and "in reality, once it does decide to carry a
publication, it [has] little or no editorial control over that publication's
contents," especially where the forum is managed by an unrelated com-
pany.185 CompuServe, therefore, functions more as a distributor of infor-
mation, analogous to a bookstore, than as a publisher. Because a
distributor of information must have knowledge or reason to have knowl-
edge of the defamatory contents before liability can be imposed, the
court held that CompuServe was not liable for any libelous material. 186
Just how much monitoring or editorial control a service provider can ex-
ert before being considered a publisher instead of a distributor for defa-
mation purposes remains to be resolved. 187
182. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
183. Id. at 137.
184. Id. at 138.
185. Id. at 140.
186. Id. at 141.
187. Johnson, supra note 180, at B1. In a more recent case, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Serv. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), Prodigy was held liable for
defamation by one of its users because Prodigy held itself out as a family-oriented service
and exercised editorial control over message content. Id. Unlike CompuServe, Prodigy




2. Playboy Enterprises v. Frena
In the area of copyright infringement, some courts have not been as
favorable to on-line service providers. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frena,188 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida held
that Frena, a computer bulletin board operator, was liable for direct copy-
right infringement solely for providing the bulletin board service on
which illegal copying was done.189 Subscribers uploaded and downloaded
graphic files scanned from 170 copyrighted photographs in Playboy Mag-
azine; Frena claimed he did not participate in the transferring of the files,
let alone have knowledge of the illegal copying.190
The court held that intent is irrelevant to a copyright infringement of
the distribution and display rights, and that innocent copying only enters
into the statutory damage calculation. 191 There is no question that the
copyrighted works were infringed in this case, or that intent is not a nec-
essary element to proving direct infringement; but the more controversial
aspect of the decision was to hold the bulletin board operator liable for
"suppl[ying] a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted
work,"'192 when the distributed 'product' "consisted simply of a service,"
and there was no determination whether the display was the operator's or
a subscriber's display.193
This decision is hard to reconcile with the Supreme Court's decision in
Sony, where Sony was held to not even be contributorily infringing (let
alone directly infringing) because its product, the VCR, was capable of a
substantial noninfringing use.' 94 That same reasoning could also apply to
a computer bulletin board system, which obviously has substantial nonin-
fringing uses. Accordingly, Frena should not have been liable for direct
infringement because he did not directly participate in the copying, and
the product he supplied merely consisted of a service, not an embodiment
of the copyrighted works. According to the facts of the case, he did not
even have knowledge of the copying. In addition, Frena should not have
been liable for contributory infringement, absent participation in or
knowledge of the copying, because his bulletin board was capable of a
substantial noninfringing use. The original source of the unauthorized
copies is the proper party to be held liable, not an unknowing on-line
service provider; this is especially true when that original source is
traceable.
If the Frena court felt that there was a high probability that Frena actu-
ally did know or should have known about the 170 graphics files, perhaps
it would have been better to acknowledge that determination and hold
188. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
189. Id. at 1559.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1556.
193. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04(A)(3)(e). The court also rejected
fair use and de minimis defenses asserted by Frena. Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1557-59.
194. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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Frena liable in light of it.195 Otherwise, rulings such as this one could
have a substantial chilling effect on on-line service growth because it is
very difficult for service providers to control content without significantly
hampering the functioning of the on-line services.
The parties reached a confidential settlement agreement after the dis-
trict court's summary judgment ruling on copyright infringement, so an
appeals court decision on the issue will have to await another case. 196
3. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA
In another case involving a bulletin board system, Sega Enterprises Ltd.
v. MAPHIA,197 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held the operator contributorily, but not directly, liable for copy-
right infringement. 198 The defendant, Chad Sherman, knew, and
specifically solicited, the uploading and downloading of unauthorized
copies of Sega's video games onto his MAPHIA bulletin board. 199 The
court found that even applying a high standard of contributory liability,
substantial participation, "Sherman's role in the copying, including pro-
viding facilities, direction, knowledge, encouragement, and seeking profit,
amounts to ... contributory copyright infringement. ' 200
In granting summary judgment for Sega, the court ordered a perma-
nent injunction against Sherman, awarded willful statutory damages of
$10,000 to Sega, and awarded costs and attorneys' fees to Sega.20'
By emphasizing contributory infringement through the knowledge and
proactive role of the bulletin board operator in the unauthorized copying,
the Sega decision seems to be more reasonable than Frena, where the
operator had no knowledge of the copying.202 Importantly, the court
held that Sherman was not liable for direct infringement because there
was no evidence that Sherman himself did or directly caused any of the
actual copying.203
Additionally, in an earlier phase of the case, the court upheld a seizure
order confiscating Sherman's software and hardware, because the Sega
195. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1371 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
196. See Johnson, supra note 180, at B14.
197. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
198. Id. at 932-33.
199. Id. at 933.
200. Id. The court rejected fair use and de minimis defenses. Id. at 935-36.
201. Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 940-41; see 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994). Section 502 provides:
(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title
may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and
final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or re-
strain infringement of a copyright.
(b) Any such injunction may be served anywhere in the United States on
the person enjoined; it shall be operative throughout the United States and
shall be enforceable, by proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United
States court having jurisdiction of that person. ...
17 U.S.C. § 502.
202. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371.
203. Sega, 948 F. Supp. at 932.
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games transferred via the bulletin board were characterized as counterfeit
under the Lanham Act.204 Copyright law itself also allows impoundment
and destruction of all infringing articles and of the means of reproduc-
tion.20 5 Injunctions and impoundment are very powerful weapons for a
plaintiff to wield, and must be taken into account when analyzing the
proper balance between copyright owners and users. Courts have read
the coverage of § 503 broadly to include a bulletin board operator's
"modems, disk drives, central processing units, and all other articles by
means of which such unauthorized or unlicensed copies were made. ' 206
4. United States v. LaMacchia
Although the bounds of civil liability are uncertain, in United States v.
LaMacchia,20 7 the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
dismissed the government's criminal case because the United States crim-
inal laws do not encompass copyright-related conduct unless there is clear
Congressional intent.20 8 The defendant, LaMacchia, set up a bulletin
board and encouraged the uploading and downloading of computer appli-
cation software and computer games. The government indicted
LaMacchia under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the wire fraud statute, for illegal
copying of copyrighted software. 20 9
The court noted that, since 1897, the mens rea for criminal copyright
infringement has required that the defendant infringe willfully and for
purpose of "'commercial advantage or private financial gain.' ' 210 But
there was no proof that LaMacchia profited from the infringement. 211
Because Congress has relied primarily "'on an array of civil remedies to
provide copyright holders protection against infringement,"' 21 2 and "has
204. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 689-90 (N.D. Cal. 1994), modi-
fied, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996); see 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
205. 17 U.S.C. § 503. Section 503 provides:
(a) At any time while an action under this title is pending, the court may
order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies
or phonorecords claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copy-
right owner's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters,
tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or pho-
norecords may be reproduced.
(b) As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruc-
tion or other reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to
have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or
other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be
reproduced.
Id
206. Central Point Software, Inc. v. Nugent, 903 F. Supp. 1057, 1061 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
Other courts have authorized the seizure of bulletin board operators' "computer equip-
ment." New Jersey Teenager Agrees to Pay $25,000 to Microsoft, Novell, WALL ST. J., Feb.
6, 1995, at B4; see infra part V.D.
207. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
208. Id. at 545.
209. Id. at 536.
210. Id. at 540 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)).
211. Id. at 536.
212. Id. at 544 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)).
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finely calibrated the reach of criminal liability [in the Copyright Act], ...
copyright prosecutions should be limited to [s]ection 506 of the [Copy-
right] Act."2 13
The court was troubled about letting LaMacchia off, and therefore rep-
rimanded him, but the court was more concerned that the
government's... interpretation of the wire fraud statute would serve
to criminalize the conduct of not only persons like LaMacchia, but
also the myriad of home computer users who succumb to the tempta-
tion to copy even a single software program for private use. It is not
clear that making criminals of a large number of consumers of com-
puter software is a result that even the software industry would con-
sider desirable.2 14
5. Frank Music Corp. v. Compuserve, Inc.
Some parties have chosen to settle their disputes commercially rather
than gamble on the unpredictability of the judicial process in addressing
an important new issue. 215 In Frank Music Corp. v. Compuserve Inc.,216
Frank Music filed a class action suit against Compuserve for providing a
bulletin board which allowed the uploading and downloading of copy-
righted musical compositions without Compuserve's knowledge. 217 Af-
ter extended negotiations, the parties came to a workable licensing
agreement, which both sides claim as a victory.218 Under the settlement,
Compuserve will pay about $500,000 to the publishers, and will require its
forum managers to pay royalties for any music downloaded from their
forums.2 19
The agreement did not settle the difficult legal questions surrounding
Compuserve's liability because Compuserve specifically preserved its
legal arguments against liability and did not procure a license for itself.220
213. Id. at 545 (quoting 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 15.05). In a separate
case, another bulletin board operator has been indicted for copyright infringement under
both the wire fraud statute and the copyright laws. Junda Woo, Copyright Laws Join Bulle-
tin Board Fight, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1994, at B11. In that case the operator allegedly
encouraged people to transmit copyrighted material, although he claims he tried to dis-
suade subscribers from doing so. Id. Because the operator was charged under the actual
copyright laws, that case should provide a more meaningful test of the applicability and
sufficiency of the criminal copyright statute.
214. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544.
215. What's the Score? Frank Music Settlement Leaves Law Unsettled But Confirms
On-Line License Possibilities, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Nov. 17, 1995, at 1.
Another infringement suit was settled recently when a New Jersey teenager agreed to pay
Microsoft Corp. and Novell, Inc. $25,000 because he was illegally distributing free copies of
their copyrighted software. New Jersey Teenager Agrees to Pay $25,000 to Microsoft,
Novell, supra note 206, at B4.
216. No. 93 Civ. 8253 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993, settlement announced Nov. 7,
1995).
217. Briefs, 51 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1159, at 162 (Dec. 16, 1993).
218. Settlement Reached in Music Publishers' Class Action Against On-Line Provider, 48
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1252, at 48 (Nov. 9, 1995).
219. What's the Score? Frank Music Settlement Leaves Law Unsettled But Confirms




As a practical matter, however, under the settlement, Compuserve ac-
cepted responsibility for unauthorized copying on its services.221 The
publishers hope the license will serve as a precedent for agreements with
other on-line services, thus avoiding costly legal actions. 222
D. THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY TRILOGY
Interestingly, the Church of Scientology is very much involved with the
courts' development of copyright law for the Internet, with three separate
suits recently litigated in U.S. district courts. "These cases are going to
make some huge determinations on whether or not system operators are
going to be held liable for what their subscribers do. ' 223 Each of these
lawsuits deals with the unauthorized postings onto the Internet of copy-
righted Church of Scientology materials exclusively licensed by the Reli-
gious Technology Center (RTC). The lawsuits provide various insights
into the ongoing debate over copyright liability and enforcement on the
Internet.
1. Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc.
In Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T.NET Inc.,224 the District
Court for the District of Colorado denied Religious Technology Center's
(RTC) motion for a preliminary injunction because RTC failed to show
likelihood of success on the merits, due to fair use by the defendants.22 5
Defendants Wollersheim and Penney are former Church members who
operate F.A.C.T.NET, a company that maintains a bulletin board on the
Internet concerning the controversy over the Church's tax exempt status
and its alleged psychological coercion of its members.
Analyzing the four fair use factors, the court found that:
(1) defendant's use was for non-commercial criticism;2 2 6
(2) the copyrighted work was esoteric in nature;22 7
221. Id.
222. Settlement Reached in Music Publishers' Class Action Against On-Line Provider,
supra note 218, at 48. The pertinent paragraph in the license agreement outlining Com-
puserve's responsibilities and defenses reads:
To the extent, if any, it is an infringement under applicable copyright laws
for any unauthorized use on Compuserve's Information Services of a musical
composition covered by this Agreement, Compuserve shall be liable therefor
.... but nothing in this Agreement shall limit any rights or defenses of Com-
puServe or the Managers under the Copyright Act in any action based on the
foregoing.
What's the Score? Frank Music Settlement Leaves Law Unsettled But Confirms On-Line
License Possibilities, supra note 215, at 1.
223. Elizabeth Wasserman, Scientology Suit Watched for Effects in Cyberspace, PORT-
LAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 12, 1995, at A20 (quoting Shari Steele, counsel to Electronic Free-
dom Frontier).
224. 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo.), verified motion for return of items granted, 907 F.
Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1995).
225. Id. at 1525-27.
226. Id. at 1525.
227. Id. This factor should favor RTC because of the nonfactual nature of the work,
but the court appears to discount this factor.
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion copied could not
properly be compared because RTC did not provide the work in its en-
tirety for comparison, and in any case, even complete copying may be fair
use;228 and
(4) there was no harm to RTC's market because there was no evidence
that a Church member would consider the posting as a substitute for an
RTC work.2
29
The court concluded that a preliminary injunction was not warranted at
such an early stage of the proceedings, and that the defendants could con-
tinue to make fair use of the materials.230
Additionally, the court ordered RTC to return all material that had
been taken from the defendants under a previous ex parte search and
seizure order.231 Highlighting some of the problems with ex parte
searches that are not carefully monitored by the court,232 RTC did not
return all of the materials, withholding what it considered to be sensitive
religious material. 233 In addition, the defendants claimed that the re-
turned materials were sabotaged by RTC.234
After learning this, the court ordered that the remaining materials be
returned to the defendants, except for the computer media containing
copyrighted works.235 The court appointed a special master to review the
materials for copyrighted works and to attempt to create replacement
computer media for the defendant without the copyrighted works.236 All
expenses were to be paid by RTC,237 but there was some damage that
could not be undone, such as RTC having access to defendants' personal
information. In the future, ex parte searches and seizures should be
strictly supervised by the courts to prevent abuse.238
2. Religious Technology Center v. Lerma
In a related lawsuit, Religious Technology Center v. Lerma,239 RTC
228. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 417).
229. Id. at 1525-26. Arnaldo P. Lerma, a F.A.C.T.NET director, actually did the post-
ing to the Internet and is the defendant in another lawsuit by the RTC. Id. at 1522.
230. Id. at 1526.
231. Id. at 1527. The seized material included documents, computer hardware, such as
compact discs, tapes, and floppies, and contained personal information as well as
F.A.C.T.NET data files. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 907 F. Supp. at 1468-69
(D. Colo. 1995).
232. Adam S. Bauman, Only Police May Search Your Home, Right? Guess Again, SE-
ATrLE TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A3.
233. George Lane, Items' Return a Sin, Scientologist Says, DENVER POST, Oct. 3, 1995,
at B2.
234. Id.
235. F.A.C.T.NET, 907 F. Supp. at 1472; see George Lane, Confiscated Scientology
Data Ordered into Hands of Court, DENVER POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at B5.
236. F.A.C.T.NET, 901 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
237. Lane, supra note 233, at B5.
238. Bauman, supra note 232, at A3.
239. 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995) (granting summary judgment for Washington
Post and its reporters), granting summary judgment for plaintiff, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569
(E.D. Va. 1996) (granting summary judgment for the RTC against Lerma).
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sued Arnaldo, Lerma, the Washington Post and two of its reporters, and
an Internet access provider for copyright infringement.240 Lerma is a for-
mer church member who posted sixty-nine pages of copyrighted RTC
works on the Internet, and the Washington Post ran a story on Lerma's
legal battle with RTC.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered
summary judgment for the Washington Post and its reporters based on
fair use; the newspaper only used forty-six words in three quotes from the
copyrighted material in reporting on the story.241 The Internet access
provider settled out of court before the judge could rule on its liability, so
that defendant was dismissed also.242 After these rulings, the only de-
fendant left in the suit was Lerma.
The court eventually held that Lerma infringed RTC's copyright by
posting a substantial portion of a copyrighted work on the Internet with-
out comment, criticism, or other significant changes that could constitute
fair use.243 The court left, the damage award temporarily pending, but
stated that the award would be $2500 (the statutory minimum of $500 for
each of five violations), absent convincing argument from RTC to the
contrary.24"
Similar to the events in F.A.C.T.NET, an ex parte search and seizure
was originally authorized, but was subsequently vacated by the court. 245
This case again illustrates the potential for abuse in an ex parte search
and seizure. The court intended to permit only a very limited search and
seizure of Lerma's computer equipment out of concern for Lerma's per-
sonal and confidential information. 246 Although the scope of the search
was supposed to be narrow, Lerma claimed that the RTC went through
many computer files not covered by the order, thus acquiring confidential
information of limited relevance to the case. 247 Because the RTC vio-
lated the spirit if not the letter of the law, and misled the court as to
which'materials were maintained and reviewed, the court vacated the writ
of seizure and ordered RTC to return all seized materials.248
3. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Services, Inc.
The third Scientology case, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Services, Inc.,249 also provides guidance in defining
240. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q,2d at 1572.
241. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1367.
242. Lerma, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1572.
243. Id. at 1580-81.
244. Id.
245. Judge Mulls Scientology Damages; Sacred Text Postings Similar to Boulder Case,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 21, 1996, at A37.
246. Charles W. Hall, Scientology Opponent Wins Partial Victory in Court, COM. AP-
PEAL, Sept. 17, 1995, at A15.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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on-line provider liability. Although Netcom eventually settled with RTC,
the court had already ruled on the liability issue, at least with respect to
summary judgment and preliminary injunction motions.2 50 In this case,
Dennis Erlich posted copyrighted RTC information on the Internet
through a bulletin board service connected to the Internet via Netcom.
RTC requested that Netcom stop the copyright infringement. Netcom
refused, stating that it was impossible to prescreen postings and also im-
possible to deny Erlich access without kicking many others off the In-
ternet. RTC subsequently sued all three parties for copyright
infringement. 251
The court in this case provides one of the better reasoned opinions on
the subject of on-line provider liability.2 52 The court analyzed copyright
law in light of the Sega preliminary injunction and Playboy holdings, the
state of technology, and general policy considerations.253 The court also
separated and analyzed individually direct, contributory and vicarious
infringement.2 54
The court found that Netcom did not directly infringe because the act
of copying was done by a subscriber who was not under the control of
Netcom. 255 The court noted that knowledge is irrelevant to the issue of
direct infringement, 256 and to the extent Frena holds otherwise, the court
disagreed with that opinion.257
The court then held that Netcom could be liable for contributory in-
fringement because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether
Netcom knew or should have known about the infringement after receiv-
ing RTC's request.258 The court stated that an on-line service provider's
lack of knowledge is reasonable when the provider cannot reasonably
verify a claim of infringement; the claim may not be verifiable because of
(1) a possible fair use defense, (2) the lack of copyright notice, or (3) the
copyright owner's failure to prove likely infringement. 25 9
The court held that vicarious liability could possibly be used in these
types of cases in general, but not in this particular case because RTC
failed to properly raise the question.260 Vicarious liability could hold a
provider liable for the actions of a subscriber if the provider "(1) has the
right and ability to control the infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct
250. Id. at 1383.
251. Id. at 1365-66.
252. But see Netcom Ruling Provides Safe Harbor for Service Providers with Clean
Hands, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOORHEES REP., Dec. 1, 1995, at 1 (arguing that ruling is
strained and that Netcom should not be liable for acts of a subscriber not under the control
of Netcom).
253. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368-73.
254. Id. at 1368-77.
255. Id. at 1372.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1371-72 & n.16-17.
258. Id. at 1375.
259. Id. at 1374.
260. Id. at 1375-77.
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financial benefit from the infringement. '261 Finally, the court held that
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Netcom had a valid fair
use defense. 262
As in the previous cases, RTC obtained an ex parte search and seizure
order and, accompanied by law enforcement officers, raided Erlich's
house, taking his computer disks.263 RTC actually went as far as Finland
to determine the identity of the sender, who was rendered anonymous by
a remailer operating in that country. 264
It is impossible to tell which way the case would have been decided had
Netcom and RTC not settled. The details of the settlement are confiden-
tial, but Netcom has now posted a new set of guidelines, stating that
Netcom will temporarily remove material about which it receives a com-
plaint, and either restore the material or remove it permanently pending
the results of an investigation. 265 In the end, the true test for on-line
provider liability should occur when a case eventually reaches the appel-
late level.266
VI. THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
Most people agree that something should be done to restore or main-
tain the balance between copyright owners and users which has been up-
set by the massive interconnection of computers via on-line services,
bulletin boards, and the Internet.267 But that is about as far as the agree-
ment goes; there are a very large number of alternative solutions being
suggested for setting the proper balance, ranging from a minor tweaking
to completely starting over.268 The issues are so contentious and the
261. Id. at 1375.
262. Id. at 1381.
263. Jim McClellan, Cyberspace: Law of the Wires, OBSERVER, Oct. 1, 1995, at 67.
264. Wasserman, supra note 223, at A20.
265. Netcom Settles Lawsuit on Scientology Copyright, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1996, at B2.
The case is still pending with respect to the remaining parties, Erlich and Klemesrud. Ben-
jamin Pimentel, Netcom Settles Scientology Copyright Suit, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1996, at
A22.
266. An increasing number of on-line service cases should be appearing in the near
future as the Internet gets easier to use and grows in popularity, raising the possibility that
a case will reach the appellate level. In one pending case, ProCD, a CD-ROM phone
directory service, sued Silken Mountain Web Service for offering ProCD's electronic
phone directories free over the Internet. A Double Whammy Wisconsin Case Intertwines
Two Key Issues: Databases Copyrights, Shrink-Wrap Licenses, INFO. L. ALERT: A VOOR-
HEES REP., Oct. 13, 1995, at 1. ProCD was granted a preliminary injunction. Id. In an-
other pending case, Third Planet Publishing, Inc. sued Jeff Pulver, an Internet publisher,
and Performance Systems Inc., Pulver's Internet access company, for posting parts of Third
Planet Publishing's software code on the Internet. Camelot Subsidiary Sues Internet Pub-
lisher for Copyright Infringement, VOICE TECH. & SERV. NEWS, Dec. 12, 1995, at 1.
267. Elizabeth Corcoran, A Digital Duel: Whose Property Is This? Business and the
'Net Cruisers Debate How and Whether Copyright Applies in Cyberspace, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 1995, at H1.
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stakes are so high that a single approach can be interpreted by various
commentators as being both a minor change and a complete overhaul.
269
A. THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
1. Overview of Recommendations
In 1993, President Clinton formed the Information Infrastructure Task
Force (IITF) to implement the National Information Infrastructure
(NII). 270 The IITF then established the Working Group on Intellectual
Property Rights to investigate the effects of the NII on intellectual prop-
erty.271 The result is the controversial White Paper, which discusses the
application of existing copyright law to the NII and recommends what the
IITF describes as the minimal changes necessary to keep copyright law
viable.272 As outlined by the White Paper, the Working Group recom-




(4) visually impaired users,
(5) criminal penalties,
(6) technological protection,
(7) copyright management information, and
(8) user education.273
The Working Group concludes that a new copyright act is not needed;
instead, current copyright law is basically adequate, but it does need a
few alterations to compensate for technological progress. 274 This could
be the Working Group's most important recommendation of all.275 The
other recommendations are much more technical and subject to varia-
tion, but the overall strategic approach should be decided in the begin-
ning and observed as the details are worked out. Unfortunately, the
Working Group seems to have deviated from this minimalist strategy in
some of its recommendations. For example, the modifications related to
technological protection are very controversial and could have far-reach-
ing consequences beyond the implications that we can currently foresee.
Each of the specific recommendations is discussed below.
276
269. Compare D.M. Osborne, Nimmer on Copyright, AM. LAW TECH., Spring 1996, at
51 (interview with David Nimmer) with Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED,
Jan. 1996, at 134.
270. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 1.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 201-36.
274. Id. at 212.
275. See Osborne, supra note 269, at 52. David Nimmer states that a common sense
incremental approach is best, at least until there is evidence that it is not working. Id.
276. At least one commentator states that the full scope of the effect of the recommen-
dations cannot be seen unless one understands the negative synergies among the eight




The White Paper recommends three changes to copyright law to deal
with electronic transmissions. First, transmission should be clearly in-
cluded in the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.277 Second, the defini-
tion of "transmit" should be amended to include the transmission of a
reproduction,278 and the definition of "publication" should be amended
to include the distribution of copies by transmission.2 79 Third, cross-bor-
der transmission should be included as a method of importing a copy of a
copyrighted work.280
As long as the limits described by the Working Group are followed,281
the changes to the definitions of transmission and publication, and the
inclusion of cross-border transmission as a method of importation, seem
acceptable.
Much more controversial is the specific inclusion of transmission in the
distribution right.2812 In the first place, this should already be covered by
existing law. Under the current law, there is enough flexibility to allow
users to browse on-line without fearing that a work they look at turns out
to be copyrighted without their being able to determine that fact before-
hand. Without sufficient clarification, the specificity of the proposed
change could be used to tip the scales against innocent browsers, because
innocent copying is not a defense to copyright infringement. Proponents
of the amendment argue that it should not be read that broadly.283 But if
transmission is going to be specifically added to the copyright law, it
seems appropriate to include permissible activities for browsing as
well. 284
Browsing without a commercial motive or profit-depriving use proba-
bly fits within the fair use defense.285 It can also be preserved through
the innocent infringer doctrine, which permits an award of zero dam-
ages.2 86 Finally, "it seems highly unlikely from a practical matter that a
copyright owner could prove such infringement or would want to sue
such an individual."28 7
But the fact that these safeguards exist does not mean that innocent
browsers would not be hassled or intimidated, keeping in mind the in-
junctions and ex parte seizure remedies that are permitted. The current
law encompasses transmissions, while allowing flexibility in its applica-
277. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 213.
278. Id. at 217.
279. Id. at 219.
280. Id. at 221.
281. Id. at 220.
282. See id. at 213.
283. Peters, supra note 268, at 352.
284. Cf. id. at 354-55.
285. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361,





tion, thus striking the proper balance between copyright owners and
users.
3. Public Performance
With the predicted mass distribution of songs digitally, the White Paper
recommends giving full public performance rights for sound recordings to
the copyright owner.288 Congress has already implemented a new law in
this area, the Digital Performance Right Law,2 89 which is probably suffi-
cient for the near future, at least until there is some feedback on how well
it is working.
4. Libraries
The White Paper recommends three changes to copyright law as it ap-
plies to libraries. First, libraries should be allowed to prepare three cop-
ies of a digital work with no more than one in use at a time.290 Second,
the mandatory copyright notice requirement should be deleted. 291 Third,
digital copying for preservation should be permitted by public libraries
and archives. 292 These recommendations appear to be reasonable and
strike the appropriate middle ground between doing away with all library
exemptions on the one hand and allowing unrestricted copying by librar-
ies on the other.2 93
5. Visually Impaired
The White Paper recommends an amendment allowing reproductions
for the visually impaired by non-profit organizations.294 This amendment
achieves a worthwhile goal while not significantly impairing copyright
owners' rights.
6. Criminal Penalties
The White Paper recommends making willful infringement by repro-
ducing or distributing copies with a value of $5000 or more a criminal
offense, even without a commercial motive.295 The change in the criminal
law is probably appropriate in view of the difficulties encountered in the
LaMacchia decision. As long as willfulness and the $5000 minimum are
288. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 223.
289. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39
(to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1994)). See supra part V.B.
290. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 227.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 225-26. The IITF also convened the Conference on Fair Use (CONFU),
which recently issued an interim report on library uses of computer programs, as well as
fair use guidelines for educational uses of digital images, distance learning, and mul-
timedia. Interim Report on Fair Use for Digital Age Is Issued by CONFU, 53 Pat. Trade-
mark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1307, at 115, 115 (Dec. 19, 1996).
294. Id. at 228.
295. Id. at 229.
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required, the commercial motive could be removed from the statute. This
amendment should fix the law in an area that is definitely out of balance.
7. Technological Protection
The White Paper recommends prohibiting products and services that
defeat technological methods of preventing unauthorized use.296 This is
perhaps the most controversial and most progress-stifling recommenda-
tion.2 97 As emphasized time and time again by the legislature and the
courts, copyright law exists to promote the progress of science, not to
excessively inhibit it.298
Although the Working Group states that this type of legislation is not
unprecedented, 299 the scope of it certainly seems to be. Other legislation
has been fairly narrowly tailored to a specific application. For example,
§ 1002 prohibits circumvention of the Serial Copy Management System
or its functional equivalent for protecting digital audio works.300 The sys-
tem covered by this law is very specifically defined and delineated, the
specifications of which are controlled by a small number of entities. Like-
wise, the Communications Act, in prohibiting the unauthorized decryp-
tion of satellite cable programming, is limited in its application to one
specific, and traditionally regulated, technology. 30 1
In contrast, the proposed legislation encompasses many technologies
that should not be so inhibited. It reads on "any device, product or com-
ponent" that has as its primary purpose the circumvention of "any pro-
cess, treatment, mechanism or system" which prevents violation of "any
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. ' 302 By putting together
the three "anys" in the proposed law, the number of combinations and
permutations of possible technological prohibitions is staggering. More-
over, the phrase "primary purpose or effect" 30 3 is used to refer to the use
of the potentially illegal device, instead of the more accepted "substantial
noninfringing use[s]. '' 304 Even the Copyright Office agrees that the
phrase can encompass legitimate business behavior. 30 5 The proposed law
296. Id. at 230.
297. The proposed new § 1201 reads:
No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, or
component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or perform any
service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright
owner or the law, any process, treatment, mechanism or system which pre-
vents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner under section 106.
Id. app. 1 at 6 (emphasis added).
298. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
299. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 233-34.
300. 17 U.S.C. § 1002.
301. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).
302. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995); S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4
(1995) (emphasis added).
303. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, app. 1 at 6.
304. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984).
305. Peters, supra note 268, at 352.
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is much too broad and indiscriminate in its application.
A far better law would allow the creation of specific implementations
of technology for copyright protection and then prohibit their circumven-
tion. This approach ensures that the amount of technology that is inhib-
ited is minimized, while copyright owners' rights are preserved. A
tailored law modeled on the one that exists for protecting digital audio
works would provide a workable compromise for copyright owners and
users.
Of course, one problem with any kind of technological protection, be it
encryption, fingerprinting, or watermarking, is that it must be continually
improved to keep ahead of those trying to circumvent it.306 "'Technical
experts continue to believe that for every technological lock placed
within the work product, there will be a pirate locksmith ready and will-
ing to break in, if not for the financial reward, then merely for the joy of
accomplishment.'1, 307
8. Copyright Management Information
The White Paper recommends prohibiting the falsification, alteration or
removal of copyright management information (name of author, copy-
right owner, terms for use, etc.) in copyrighted works.308 As with some of
the other amendments, this does not appear to be too controversial,
although it must be carefully constructed so as not to conflict with the
Berne Convention.
9. User Education
The White Paper recommends that a substantial effort be made to in-
crease public awareness of intellectual property law.30 9 This effort would
include not just a list of permitted and non-permitted user activities, but
also the reasoning behind the law and how it promotes the public wel-
fare. 310 With this knowledge, the Working Group hopes that users will
understand the potential ripple effects of seemingly harmless individual
activities on the Internet.311
To address the problem, in March 1995 the Working Group started the
Copyright Awareness Campaign (CAC) with three goals in mind: (1)
raising public awareness of intellectual property, (2) developing model
educational curricula to be available to educators at all levels, and (3)
providing a means of easy public access to accurate and current copyright
information.31 2
306. Id. at 353.
307. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04(A)(3)(e), at n.129.21 (quoting A.
BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? 90 (1994)).
308. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, at 235.
309. Id. at 201-02.
310. Id. at 202.
311. Id. at 203.
312. Id. at 203-04.
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Increasing the general public knowledge level is a commendable goal,
as long as the education is truly used to educate the public about the
actual state of the law. There is the possibility, however, that the educa-
tional campaign could be used to manipulate or intimidate the public with
misstatements or overstatements about the extent of protection permit-
ted by copyright laws. Therefore, CAC activities should be monitored by
objective observers to ensure that the CAC goal is education and not
misinformation.
B. THE NII COPYRIGHT PROTEcT ION ACT OF 1995
Immediately following the publication of the White Paper, identical
bills H.R. 2441313 and S. 1284,314 known as the NII Copyright Protection
Act of 1995, were introduced in the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively. These bills adopted the White Paper's legislative
recommendations verbatim, 15 and shifted the copyright debate from the
academic and on-line worlds to the political forum. The primary focus of
the debate was the liability of on-line service providers, who were seeking
a safe harbor from responsibility for the acts of their subscribers.316 In
contrast, content providers argued strongly against any changes to the
bills, especially anything granting on-line service providers an exemption
from liability.317
After months of negotiations between on-line service providers and
content providers, each side made concessions in an attempt to balance
their respective rights and responsibilities. 318 The competing interests ar-
rived at a compromise by proposing a new § 512 for Title 17, entitled
"Limitations on liability of providers of on-line services or internet ac-
cess."'319 The key features of the proposed § 512 include:
(1) xemptions for certain service providers;
(2) notification and identification requirements;
(3) a safe harbor for service providers;
(4) limited damages for service providers;
(5) clarification of fair use; and
(6) broadening of the technological protection provision. 320
Service providers that function as "'mere conduits' for transmission of
copyrighted material" would be exempt from liability for infringement of
313. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
314. S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
315. Peters, supra note 268, at 349.
316. House Subcommittee Considers Limited Internet Copyright Bill, AuDoIO WEEK,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 1.
317. House Panel Debates On-Line Copyright Exemptions, COMM. TODAY, Feb. 8,1996,
at 1.
318. Mike Mills, Bill Attacks Copyright Minefield; House Subcommittee Considers Au-
thors' On-Line Rights, WASH. POST, May 15, 1996, at C1.
319. House Panel Set to Consider Omnibus Copyright Measure, 52 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1279, at 120, 120-21 (May 23, 1996).
320. Id. at 121.
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that material.321 For other copyright infringements, a complainant must
have a good faith belief that the material constitutes infringement before
notifying the service provider.322 Once notified, a service provider that
promptly removes or blocks the allegedly infringing material cannot be
liable for vicarious or contributory infringement. 323 If found liable for
unintentional vicarious or contributory infringement, the damages paya-
ble by a service provider would be limited to $1000 per work infringed. 324
Section 107 would also be amended "to clarify that distribution 'by
transmission' can be a fair use," 325 thus compensating for the inclusion of
"transmission" in the distribution right in the original bill.
The revised amendment would still include a new § 12 for Title 17 to
cover copyright management and protection schemes. This amendment
actually strengthens the content providers' protection by broadening the
range of prohibited devices. Instead of the "primary purpose or effect"
phrase, 326 the revision would more broadly prohibit devices "an effect of
which" is bypassing copyright protection systems.327 With both service
providers and content providers compromising on the amendment, the
broadening of this provision may indicate an area in which the interests
of the public in general are not sufficiently represented by either party to
the negotiations.328
Perhaps fortuitously, one result of the long and contentious debate is
that the Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995 stalled without being
passed by the 104th Congress, which will allow further scrutiny of the
issues involved.
C. ALTERNATIVES TO THE WORKING GROUP'S RECOMMENDATIONS
Because reaction to the White Paper ranges from full support to com-
plete enmity, a great many alternatives have been proposed by a variety
of sources. Several of the ideas, which differ from those previously dis-
cussed, are mentioned below.
First, the most drastic idea is to start over and redo the whole system,
tailored to the protection of digital media. Creating a brand new, spe-
cific, and workable plan to replace the current scheme, however, is ex-
tremely difficult. 329 With copyright law having functioned so well for so
long, this alternative is too drastic at the present time.
Second, some promote the idea that there will be a dramatic restructur-
ing of the way in which authors will make money. These people suggest
321. Carey R. Ramos & Carl W. Hampe, 'Mere Conduit' Exemption Stirs Debate; Leg-
islation Introduced in Congress, 216 N.Y. L.J., Sept. 30, 1996, at S1.
322. House Panel Set to Consider Omnibus Copyright Measure, supra note 319, at 121.
323. Id.
324. Mills, supra note 318, at C1.
325. House Panel Set to Consider Omnibus Copyright Measure, supra note 319, at 121.
326. WHITE PAPER, supra note 9, app. 1, at 6
327. House Panel Set to Consider Omnibus Copyright Measure, supra note 319, at 121.
328. See discussion supra part VI.A.7.
329. Corcoran, supra note 267, at H1.
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that most content will be free eventually, and publishing organizations
will make money through ancillary services. 330 Clamping down too
tightly on copyright will inhibit this evolution. Again, it remains to be
seen whether the marketplace will actually move in this direction.
Third, there is the honor system, 331 but this really has not worked in
other areas, especially where the idea of free use is already firmly en-
trenched. Fourth, there is the idea of self-imposed "cybercourts" that
provide outside arbitrators to resolve on-line copyright disputes. 332 A
fifth idea is to better educate the users.333 An electronic contract be-
tween on-line providers and users may help to relieve the provider from
liability.334 In addition, legal warnings would periodically flash on the
user's screen to remind them of their responsibilities. 335
A sixth idea is to electronically mark works with an unremovable signa-
ture and then charge users when that work is used.336 Finally, lump-sum
royalties based on access, similar to those paid by the CCC, could be used
to compensate copyright owners.337
Perhaps the best thing that happened to the White Paper is that it
moved into the political process, where each side has been forced to listen
to and compromise with the other. Both the content providers and the
on-line service providers have the necessary resources to participate in
the political process, so hopefully neither side can steamroll the other. In
fact, many companies participate in both industries, thus further assuring
that a reasonable, common sense result will eventually be reached. Se-
lecting the best alternative is an extremely difficult task that is best ac-
complished, unfortunately, using hindsight. Because we do not have that
luxury, drastic changes are probably not appropriate at the present time.
And because we cannot know what method among the various alterna-
tives is the best one, it seems prudent to work with the one that has two
hundred years of history to back it up.
D. THE WIPO COPYRIGHT CONFERENCE OF 1996
Even when a new balance between copyright and digital technology is
achieved in the United States, it will be ineffective unless the rest of the
countries around the world enforce the same rules, due to the interna-
tional, border-defying nature of the Internet. With precisely this issue in
mind, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) held a diplo-
matic conference from December 2 to 20, 1996, to address the challenges
330. Id.
331. Erik J. Heels & Richard P. Klau, On-Line, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1995, at 35, 36.
332. Daniel Pearl, On-Line: Government Tackles a Surge of Smut on the Internet, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 8, 1995, at B1.
333. Junda Woo & Jared Sandberg, Copyright Law Is Easy to Break on the Internet,
Hard to Enforce, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1994, at B6.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Corcoran, supra note 267, at H1.




to copyright wrought by modern digital technology. 338
The Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions (Copyright Conference) in Geneva actually considered
three separate treaties, which were released on August 30, 1996 for inter-
national review prior to the Copyright Conference. 339 The three treaties
are (1) a "'Draft WIPO Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works,"' (2) a "'Draft WIPO Treaty on
the Protection of the Rights of Performers and Producers of Phono-
grams,"' and (3) a "'Draft WIPO Treaty on Intellectual Property in Re-
spect of Databases.' ' 340 Representatives from 160 countries voted to
pass the first two treaties, but only after some important amendments
were made. 34' The third treaty, providing sui generis protection for
databases, was too controversial and deemed by many countries as not
ripe for consideration. 342
The first two treaties mirror each other, but address different copy-
rightable subject matter. The first treaty extends the Berne Convention
protection of literary and artistic works to digital transmission.343 And
for the first time, the second treaty provides global protection for sound
recordings and includes digital transmissions of protected works. 344
The first treaty originally contained a broad provision, article 7, which
stated that the exclusive reproduction right "shall include direct and indi-
rect reproduction of [a copyrighted work], whether permanent or tempo-
rary, in any manner or form. ' 345 But in last minute negotiations,
"telephone companies, Internet-access providers and free-speech advo-
cates persuaded negotiators to delete" article 7 from the treaty.346 It ap-
pears that the information and telecommunications industries, along with
338. WIPO Plans to Draft Protocol to Berne Convention, 8 No. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RrS.
28, 28 (1996).
339. WIPO Proposals Would Extend Berne to Digital Technologies, 52 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1294, at 494, 494 (Sept. 19, 1996).
340. Proposed WIPO Treaty to Protect Databases Draws Fire at PTO Briefing, 53 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1302, at 33, 33 (Nov. 14, 1996).
341. Drawing the Copyright Map, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1996, at A10.
342. Copyright Accords Guard Against Software Piracy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1996, at
B6. The treaty on databases would have actually provided substantially increased protec-
tion over current law for the owners of databases. WIPO Proposals Would Extend Berne
to Digital Technologies, supra note 339, at 495. Any legislation protecting the contents of
databases should be carefully drafted in order to balance the public's right to access factual
information, but still provide incentive to authors to expend the considerable effort re-
quired to compile useful databases. For example, opponents of the treaty on databases
stated that it would give sports leagues and stock exchanges the exclusive right to the statis-
tics that they generate. Copyright Accords Guard Against Software Piracy, supra, at B6.
343. Frances Williams, Welcome for Updated Rules on Copyright, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1996, at 3.
344. Copyright Accords Guard Against Software Piracy, supra note 342, at B6.
345. World Intellectual Property Organization, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Pro-
visions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, art. 7(1) (Aug. 30, 1996) <http://
www.wipo.int/eng/diplconf/4dc_a07.htm>.
346. Seth Schiesel, Treaties Negotiated to Extend International Copyright Law, L.A.
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 1996, at N1.
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consumers, were able to voice their opinions loudly enough to be heard,
due in part to trans-atlantic lobbying over the Internet itself.347 As a
compromise, the treaty drafters attached to the treaties explanatory notes
containing a vague description of the distinction between temporary
browsing and permanent reproductions. 348 These explanatory notes "will
provide legal guidance but [are] not legally binding" on the member
countries.349
The first treaty also originally contained a broad provision on techno-
logical measures, article 13, which would make illegal the "importation,
manufacture or distribution of protection-defeating devices, . . . by any
person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the device...
will be used for ... the exercise of rights provided under this Treaty that
is not authorized by the rightholder or the law.' '350 This language is simi-
lar to that used by the White Paper, but it adds a knowledge requirement,
as opposed to the strict liability standard adopted by the White Paper.351
Even so, intense lobbying forced a modification to this article, which now
merely states that member countries "shall provide adequate legal pro-
tection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the
exercise of their rights under this Treaty. '352 The amended treaty shifts
the debate over technological prohibitions, along with on-line browsing
and the unaddressed issue of service-provider liability, back to the na-
tional level, where each nation will determine how to best conform with
the treaty.
In addition, each of the 160 countries must still enact their own na-
tional legislation in order to implement the treaties themselves. 353 This
process could take many years, so the full effect of the treaties on the
Internet is difficult to determine at the present time.354 But the passage
of the two treaties should have two immediate effects: (1) it will en-
courage some copyright owners to put their works on-liie, secure in the
knowledge that the governments of the world are committed to protect-
ing the copyright owners' investment, and (2) the treaties and associated
negotiations will influence U.S. lawmaking efforts when the White Paper
recommendations are revisited in the next session of Congress. 355
347. Drawing the Copyright Map, supra note 341, at A10.
348. Alexander G. Higgins, Copyright Conference Boosts Internet/lInternational Treaty
Exempts Copies Made by Web Browsers, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 21, 1996, at A31.
349. Id.
350. World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 345, art. 13.
351. WIPO Proposals Would Extend Berne to Digital Technologies, supra note 339, at
495-96.
352. World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 345, art. 13.
353. Williams, supra note 343, at 3.
354. Drawing the Copyright Map, supra note 341, at A10.
355. The Clinton administration is currently determining whether new copyright legisla-
tion is required to comply with the two treaties. Clinton Administration Is Undecided on
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In light of the recent international developments, and the stalled status
of the original White Paper legislative proposals, some changes to the pro-
posals are in order before they are reconsidered by Congress. First, clari-
fication should be given on the status of on-line service providers. The
courts' opinions in Sega and Netcom provide fair, balanced standards for
direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement, which should
be adopted by higher courts or the legislature. Second, although a ban on
a specific implementation of a technology is not unprecedented in copy-
right law, the recommended ban is much too general and large in scope.
If it can be tailored to specific encryption or watermarks used in transmit-
ted works, perhaps that would be narrow enough. Anything larger would
interfere with the development of technology that has substantial nonin-
fringing uses. Third, there should be some type of exception for electron-
ically transmitting a copy and subsequently destroying the original. As
the recommendations stand, this use, which functions the same as trans-
ferring a physical book, would be infringing. Fourth, on-line browsing,
which requires making a temporary copy on a display or in computer
memory, should not be considered an infringing use. This would cut too
deeply into the basic operation of the Internet and the dissemination of
information.
Because the Internet is still in its infancy, and because it holds a great
deal of promise for the future, we should not prematurely inhibit its
growth. Modern digital technology and copyright law can coexist, albeit
in a carefully circumscribed balance. "'[W]e know simply enough to ap-
preciate the magnitude of the problem without having the foggiest idea of
where the appropriate solution lies.' 356 Therefore the White Paper's
general recommendation of making minimal changes in the near term is
very appropriate and should function as the guiding principle for any
changes that are made to our copyright laws.
356. D.M. Osborne, New Copyright Treaty: Too Much, Too Soon?, AM. LAw TECH.,
Spring 1997, at 19, 19 (quoting David Nimmer).
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